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MOYRA FOWLER 
Institute of Education, University of London 
I want to begin by thanking my colleague Tatsuya Ishizaki for his paper which now offers me 
an opportunity to address two or three themes linked to my own research. Tatsuya's paper has 
among other things directed our attention to a particular viewpoint that identifies limits to 
language when used to address a notion of being beyond the self. Tatsuya weaves together 
elements from the works of Wittegenstein, from Paul Standish and from Emmanual Levinas as 
part of his exploration, far beyond the scope of my own research. So I will beg your indulgence 
and offer a reply to Tatsuya based in my own understanding of Levinas, his philosophy of ethics 
centered in this idea of being beyond the self and the part that language plays in achieving that 
ethical stance in the world including something on the issue of transcendence. 
 If I start by looking at this idea of being beyond the self and its centering by Levinas in an 
absolutely necessary relationship with the other that he describes as ethical. I might underline the 
importance that Levinas attaches to this relationship by using his own descriptor of ethics as first 
philosophy. First and before all other modes of understanding of being beyond the self. The only 
means by which an autonomous human being can journey beyond the self through a relationship 
with the other. 
 I won't expand much further on that  interpretation here. An expansion as such would be a 
paper in itself. What I will say is that Levinas' treatment of philosophy as ontology from Plato 
through Descartes to Heidegger is not dismissive of all that these philosophers have to say on the 
subject of being but to my mind is a detailed and thorough search for the ethical account of the 
other within their works. From which he concludes that even where there may be traces of the 
consideration of alterity, the strength of an historical appeal to totalising ontology and 
inescapable subjectivity results in each case in the exclusion, dismissal or even overpowering of 
the other. 
 How then does Levinas suppose that we might escape this overpowerment? 
 Levinas sites the ethical relation with the other (I reiterate to his mind the only mode or means 
of being beyond the self), in language. Is language our escape? What if language naturally 
brings with its use some limits in communication, in understanding, in transmission? What are 
these limits and where and how do they occur? How, given these circumstances can the ethical 
relationship seemingly centered in language be achieved? 
 Let us take two situations where language is used and where we may at first glance find little 
hint of overpowerment, where we may gain instead a degree of comfort in the consideration of 
one human being for another perhaps in a rather idealised description of the act and circumstance 
of  communication. The first might occur between teacher and pupil while the second revolves
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around individuals coming together from across the world. In the first instance we may assume 
that knowledge safely built on an historical understanding of facts, if not a conceptual account 
of that understanding at least uses a shared language. We may also consider that the role of the 
teacher itself lends additional authority to that which is spoken while the willing student remains 
open to and engaged in that learning. 
 In the second example we may assume that while a first greeting between individuals who 
meet as strangers may test the limits of confidence in each, (the transmission of a conceptual 
understanding seemingly beyond possibility at that moment), an eventual degree of 
understanding may be achievable with goodwill and effort in the longer term. 
 To Levinas, both interpretations are open to question. Not through the limits of language but 
by the fact that they are once again centered in an historical appeal to a totalising interpretation 
of knowledge on the one hand and an inescapable subjectivity on the other. Each, without intent 
resulting in the exclusion, dismissal or even overpowering absorption of the other who is 
stranger and separate and ever remains so. How then would the detail of Levinas's interpretation 
vary from those above and what part would a different interpretation of language play in 
ensuring the survival of an ethical relation with the other? 
 In relation to the teacher, if we take a totalising view of knowledge that we have already 
identified might share a common language, Levinas is clear. Cognition and reason can act to 
neutralise the other, become a theme, an object, a concept, all measured against a horizon which 
itself is a limit (separate from language). While he acknowledges that this is how knowledge 
 `plays out' in the world he asks what harm is imposed by this boundary
, this conceptual horizon 
when it excludes the other and what imposition does it necessarily place on the recognition of 
knowledge itself including our attempts to consider being beyond ourselves. 
 To Levinas teaching is a conversation with the other which  'overflows the idea a thought 
would carry away from it'. It, (that is teaching)  'comes from the exterior', bringing me in my 
role as teacher  'more that I contain'. It is this calling into question by the presence of the other 
that is ethics. If I comprehend then alterity vanishes. I can view knowledge as a relation where 
 `the knowing being manifests  itself and thereby deadens my encounter with the other or I can 
see a relationship begun in language as  'primordially acted as a conversation' where the  'I' 
leaves itself. 
 To do this then I must accept that this conversation, this discourse will not be an  'unfolding 
of a prefabricated internal logic but the constitution of truth in struggle—with all the risks that 
freedom implies. The very strangeness of those speaking brings forward the possibility of a 
revelation of the other to me. Language in this sense is used when  'community' is wanting. 
Where the  'common plane is yet to be constituted'. 
 Our second example now somehow falls into place. We may choose to consider ourselves 
already on a plane with boundaries that even if not yet visible may become so when a light is 
shone. And is there not a very human drive in situations of good will, myself and the other on 
a single plane in a relationship established through language, to make a serious effort to 
comprehend? Where we both may choose to call upon accepted interpretations as played out in 
history to establish common ground? Is this not evidence of a pre-established relationship that 
we cannot escape? 
 To Levinas, this is again both false and excluding of the other because it comes from a central
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acceptance that we exist as part of an subjective totality where discoveries await their own 
revealing and where each of us is interpretable by the other. Rather instead let us breach that 
totality in language that allows a relationship  'such that the other remains transcendent to the 
same'. 
 And here we come to the issue of transcendence in Levinas. Does he use this as a familiar 
phenomenological term or is his use both exclusive and an example of an effort to overcome the 
limits of language when used to address a notion of being beyond the  self? I would say yes. Yes, 
in terms of the constant struggle that Levinas faces in his writings, where he necessarily has to 
make strenuous efforts to remain disengaged from a totalising, subjective stance while presenting 
his carefully thought through thoughts (in this sense how can he avoid the  said?). It is as part 
of these struggles that words like transcendence are used, in this case to denote a  'distance in 
depth' which he hopes is  'irreducible to the distance the synthetic activity of the understanding 
establishes between terms', thus escaping totalisation. But more than that, beyond his struggles 
with conveying conceptual thought, Levinas sites the ethical relationship with the other in 
language as it is spoken. Where the unpredictability of conversation can breach the subjective 
totality and where the presence of the other calls into question my own spontaneity—and this is 
that which Levinas calls ethics. 
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